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Abstract 
In late 2008, at the height of the Global Financial Crisis, increased liquidity premia and risk 
aversion in the secondary market hindered companies’ ability to issue corporate bonds. In 
response, in January 2009, Her Majesty’s Treasury authorized the Bank of England to 
establish a facility to purchase commercial bonds through the Asset Purchase Facility. In 
March 2009, the Bank of England published details on the Corporate Bond Secondary Market 
Scheme, in conjunction with its quantitative easing program. Under the scheme, the Bank 
acted as a market maker of last resort in the secondary bond market, making regular 
purchases of a wide range of high quality, sterling-denominated corporate bonds. In doing 
so, the Bank hoped to improve the functioning of the secondary market, thereby removing 
barriers to credit for UK companies. The purchase program was augmented in 2010, when 
the Bank began to sell corporate bonds through similar frequent auctions. Purchases through 
the scheme peaked in the second quarter of 2010, at £1.6 billion. Citing improved liquidity 
in the secondary market and the related decline in usage of the scheme, the Bank began 
phasing out the Corporate Bond Secondary Market Scheme in 2013, and it was officially 
closed in August 2016. 
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1 This case study is part of the Yale Program on Financial Stability (YPFS) selection of New Bagehot Project 
modules considering the responses to the global financial crisis that pertain to market liquidity programs. 
Cases are available from the Journal of Financial Crises at https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/journal-of-
financial-crises/. 









At a Glance  
During the Global Financial Crisis, dealers 
in the corporate bond secondary market 
withdrew from the market, thereby 
constraining access to corporate credit, or 
charged increasing liquidity premia, 
raising the cost for primary issuers.  
To address this liquidity crisis, the Bank of 
England initiated the Corporate Bond 
Secondary Market Scheme under its Asset 
Purchase Facility (APF) in March 2009. 
Through the scheme, the Bank aimed to act 
as a market maker of last resort, to improve 
price discovery and transparency, and to 
revitalize the secondary market rather than to replace it. It conducted multiple purchases of 
small quantities of corporate bonds each week in the secondary market. Bonds were 
required to be issued by corporations that made a material contribution to economic activity 
in the UK. In 2010, the scheme was extended so that the Bank could sell, as well as purchase, 
corporate bonds.  
The scheme was utilized throughout 2009 and 2010, with purchases peaking at £1.6 billion 
in the second quarter of 2010. In 2013, the Bank announced that regular sales would stop, 
and that the scheme would be utilized only if there was market demand. No such demand 
materialized, and in August 2016, the scheme was formally closed.  
Summary Evaluation 
The Corporate Bond Secondary Market Scheme is generally viewed as successful, but its 
effects are difficult to isolate from those of the larger APF and quantitative easing program 
that were initiated by the Bank simultaneously.   
Summary of Key Terms 
Purpose: To improve market liquidity in order to 
remove obstacles to corporate access to credit. 
Announcement Date   March 19, 2009 
Operational Date March 25, 2009 
Expiration Date August 4, 2016 
Peak Utilization £1.6 billion 
Participants HM Treasury, Bank of 
England 
Corporate Bond Secondary Market Scheme  
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Corporate Bond Secondary Market Scheme:  United Kingdom Context 
GDP 
(SAAR, Nominal GDP in LCU 
converted to USD) 
$3,102.8 billion in 2007 
$2,948.0 billion in 2008 
 
Source: Bloomberg 
GDP per capita 
(SAAR, Nominal GDP in LCU 
converted to USD) 
$50,567 in 2007 
$47,287 in 2008 
 
Source: Bloomberg 
Sovereign credit rating (5-
year senior debt) 
 



















Size of banking system 
 
$4,895.3 billion in total assets in 2007 
$5,299.6 billion in total assets in 2008 
 
Source: Bloomberg 
Size of banking system as a 
percentage of GDP 
157.8% in 2007 
179.8% in 2008 
 
Source: Bloomberg 
Size of banking system as a 
percentage of financial 
system 
Data not available for 2007/2008  
 
Source: World Bank Global Financial Development 
Database 
5-bank concentration of 
banking system 
 
76.8% of total banking assets in 2007 
79.1% of total banking assets in 2008 
 
Source: World Bank Global Financial Development 
Database 
Foreign involvement in 
banking system 
14% of total banking assets in 2007 
19% of total banking assets in 2008 
 
Source: World Bank Global Financial Development 
Database 
Government ownership of 
banking system 
Data not available for 2007 
1% of banks owned by the state in 2008 
 
Source: Call et al. “Bank Ownership – Trends and 
Implications” 
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Existence of deposit 
insurance 
100% insurance on deposits up to $4,000; 90% on 
next $66,000 in 2007 
100% insurance on deposits up to $93,000 after 
October 2008  
 









I.  Overview 
Background 
During the Global Financial Crisis, the cost of issuing new debt rose as investors demanded 
increased liquidity premia. In addition, increased cost of funding inventories of corporate 
bonds caused banks to withdraw from the secondary market (Pattani et al. 2011). In early 
2009, the Bank of England deemed that poor liquidity in the secondary corporate bond 
market could negatively affect the primary market, further constraining the availability of 
credit in capital markets. Spreads in the primary market over gilts were already wide, and 
widening further as issuance increased (Figure 1) (Fisher 2010). 
Figure 1: Investment-Grade Corporate Bond Spreads(a) 
 
Source: Fisher 2010 
 
Program Description 
The framework for the Corporate Bond Secondary Market Scheme (the Scheme) was laid out 
in the exchange of letters between the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Governor of the 
Bank of England that established the Asset Purchase Facility (APF). It was formally 
introduced through a Bank of England Market Notice on March 19, 2009, and became 
operational on March 25. Through the Scheme, the Bank proposed “to provide a back-stop 
offer to purchase modest amounts of a wide range of investment-grade sterling UK corporate 
bonds with the aim of improving secondary market liquidity, initially by facilitating market-
making by banks and dealers.” It hoped that the purchase would reduce liquidity premia on 
high quality corporate bonds, and thus remove obstacles to corporate access to capital 
markets (Bank of England, “Market Notice: Asset Purchase Facility,” March 19, 2009).   
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Similar to the requirements for the Commercial Paper Facility (CPF), in order to be eligible, 
bonds had to be investment grade and issued in sterling by companies that made a material 
contribution to economic activity in the UK. Reverse auctions were held multiple times a 
week, in which counterparties submitted bids for the price they were willing to sell specific 
bonds.  The Bank did not buy every bond at each auction, since it privately established a 
minimum spread at which it would purchase each bond (Benford et al). The Bank would 
readily purchase up to £5 million of each bond in a given auction, depending on the amount 
of the issuer’s outstanding debt. For issuers with less than £250 million outstanding, the 
bank would stand ready to purchase up to £2 million of each bond, and for those with more 
than £250 million outstanding, the Bank would stand ready to purchase up to £5 million 
(Bank of England, “Market Notice: Asset Purchase Facility,” March 19, 2009). 
The Bank regularly posted traded prices on its wire service and its website. Following each 
reverse auction, around 1 p.m., the Bank published information on the successful yield 
spreads and quantities purchased in individual eligible bonds. Additionally, each Friday the 
Bank published the total amount of corporate bonds purchased the previous week as well as 
the sum of corporate bonds purchased, less redemptions, through the Scheme (Bank of 
England, “Market Notice: Asset Purchase Facility,” March 19, 2009). 
As part of the larger APF, the purchases were financed by central bank reserves through the 
Bank’s quantitative easing program, which was announced by the Monetary Policy 
Committee on March 5, 2009. By injecting money into the economy through the purchase of 
public and private sector assets, including corporate bonds, the Bank aimed to stimulate 
spending to reach the 2% inflation target (Bank of England, “Market Notice: Sterling 
Monetary Framework; Asset Purchases,” 2009). On February 4, 2010, however, the 
Chancellor authorized the Bank’s purchases under APF to be financed by the issuance of 
Treasury bills (Bank of England APF Quarterly Report 2010 Q2).   
In January 2010, the Bank decided to extend the APF by offering to sell, as well as purchase, 
corporate bonds through the Corporate Bond Secondary Market Scheme. The Scheme 
opened to sales on January 8, 2010. The Bank planned to sell each security in which it had a 
nominal holding over £1 million every Friday. However, it reserved the right to not sell any 
security, and determined how much of each bond to sell (between £1 million and £5 million) 
by “tak[ing] into account a number of factors, including the size of the Bank’s existing 
holdings of the issuer’s bonds.” Similar to the purchase program, the Bank published 
information on the successful yield spreads and quantities sold for each individual bond 
following the auction (Bank of England, “Market Notice: Asset Purchase Facility, Corporate 
Bond Secondary Scheme,” December 22, 2009). 
Rather than target a specific amount of corporate bond purchases, and later sales, the 
Corporate Bond Secondary Market Scheme was designed to last only until normal conditions 
returned to the primary and secondary markets (King 2009). The ultimate goal of the 
Scheme was “to be catalytic, helping to reinvigorate the market, rather than replace it” 
(“Markets and Operations,” 2009).  
Outcomes 
Purchases through the Scheme peaked in the second quarter of 2010, at £1.6 billion. This 
represented a small percentage of the overall bond market, which before the crisis totaled 
about £70 billion (Fisher 2010). In 2013, the Corporate Bond Secondary Scheme was moved 
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to operating only if warranted by market demand. Since none was indicated through mid-
2016, and because at that point the Bank introduced a new Corporate Bond Purchase 
Scheme, the Corporate Bond Secondary Scheme was formally closed on August 4, 2016 
(Bank of England, “Market Notice: Asset Purchase Facility, Corporate Bond Purchase 
Scheme,” August 4, 2016). 
II. Key Design Decisions                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
1. The Scheme was launched to provide a backstop offer to purchase small amounts 
of a wide range of high quality sterling corporate bonds in order to aid secondary 
market liquidity.  
The purchases were expected to assist market-making by banks and dealers, to reduce 
liquidity premia on high quality bonds, and therefore remove obstacles to corporate access 
to capital markets. The Scheme was also expected to complement purchases of commercial 
paper under the CPF (Bank of England, “Market Notice: Asset Purchase Facility,” 2009).  
2. The Scheme was announced without a size limit or an end date.  
The Scheme was a part of an Asset Purchase Facility (APF) that had a ceiling initially set at 
£50 billion. However, for the Scheme, rather than setting a specific timeline or target 
purchase amount, the Bank of England designed the facility to last for as long as the highly 
abnormal conditions in corporate credit markets that were impairing finance of real 
economic activity persisted (Bank of England, “Market Notice: Asset Purchase Facility,” 
2009). 
3. The Bank consulted with the industry in the design of the Scheme.  
Before the operation of the Scheme, a market notice announcing the program requested 
feedback from the industry. The request included invitation for detailed comments from all 
interested parties—existing and potential new issuers, investors, intermediaries, and 
infrastructure providers, including issuing and paying agents and ratings agencies (Bank of 
England, “Market Notice: Asset Purchase Facility,” 2009). 
4. The Scheme purchased eligible corporate bonds from market-making firms in the 
secondary market. 
Unlike the CPF, the Corporate Bond Secondary Market Scheme specifically targeted 
secondary market liquidity. The goal of the Scheme was to improve impaired market 
liquidity that had resulted from dealers’ capital constraints and risk aversion during the 
crisis (“Markets and Operations,” 2009). Secondary market illiquidity in turn restricted the 
strength of the primary market, impairing access to credit. To improve secondary market 
liquidity, the Bank purchased corporate bonds exclusively from market makers (Bank of 
England, “Market Notice: Asset Purchase Facility,” March 19, 2009).  
These design decisions reflected the Bank’s desire to act as a Market Maker of Last Resort 
(MMLR). As an MMLR, the Bank hoped to “aid improvements in the liquidity of the market, 
including by reducing the inventory risk to ‘market makers’” (Tucker 2009). Though the 
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Bank purchased bonds only in the secondary market, it believed that establishing itself as an 
MMLR would reinvigorate both the secondary market and the primary market (Fisher 2010). 
5. The Scheme conducted the purchases via frequent reverse auctions, with a 
maximum amount of £5 million per bond per auction.  
In each auction, the Bank was restricted to buying no more than £5 million of each bond, 
depending on the amount of the issuer’s outstanding debt. Though that amount was 
relatively small, the frequency of the auctions, which at the beginning of the Scheme occurred 
four times a week, was intended to signal to bond holders that they could sell bonds if 
necessary. The Bank believed that this would lower the interest rates that counterparties 
charged for holding corporate bonds (Benford et al. 2009). 
Purchasing small quantities of corporate bonds also aligned with the MMLR framework, 
which the Bank specified involved transacting in “modest quantities” (Fisher 2010). 
Purchases through the Scheme were much smaller than the gilt purchases undertaken 
through the APF. Initially, critics of the Scheme pointed to the small amount of bonds 
purchased as a sign of failure. However, the Bank insisted that this reflected a 
misunderstanding of the Scheme’s intent, which was to improve the process of price 
discovery and encourage private sector demand (Fisher 2010). In addition, Bank officials 
noted that though large scale corporate bond purchases may have helped drive down market 
spreads, it also may have displaced private sector demand, asserting that “the problem was 
in the functioning of the market, not a lack of demand for the assets” (Fisher 2010).  
6. Pricing information was made publicly available.  
As previously discussed, the Bank made pricing information publicly available after each 
reverse auction. This was critical to improving price discovery and transparency and to 
establishing pricing points (“Markets and Operations,” 2009). This transparency aimed to 
reduce uncertainty over the market value of corporate bonds, in turn reducing the risk 
aversion that contributed to market illiquidity (Benford et al. 2009).   
7. The Scheme was extended to sales of corporate bonds in 2010.   
Despite improvements in the primary market throughout 2009, dealers in the secondary 
market were still reluctant to trade in corporate bonds. Illiquidity in the market was 
attributed to an absence of buyers as well as to dealers’ fears that they would be unable to 
buy back bonds from the APF (“Markets and Operations,” 2009). This led to the Bank’s 
decision in early 2010 to open up the Scheme to sales as well as purchases of corporate bonds 
(Fisher 2010). Bank documents confirm that the extension of the Scheme to sales was 
specifically aimed toward “catalys[ing] secondary market liquidity” (Bank of England, 
“Market Notice: Asset Purchase Facility, Corporate Bond Secondary Scheme,” December 22, 
2009).   
III. Evaluation  
In 2010, Bank officials pointed to record issuance of sterling corporate bonds (Figure 2), 
diminished spreads for eligible bonds (Figure 3), narrowed bid-offer spreads, and a 
contracted bond-CDS basis as evidence that the Scheme increased access to financing in the 
496





primary market (Fisher 2010). This was attributed to the Corporate Bond Secondary Market 
Scheme’s impact on illiquidity premia. Counterparties also reported anecdotally to the Bank 
that the publication of pricing information and auction results “reduced the uncertainty for 
investors in valuing their portfolios and established, for dealers, a price at which others were 
willing to sell” (“Markets and Operations,” 2009). Despite these improvements in the 
primary corporate bond market, illiquidity remained in the secondary market. This led to 
the Bank’s decision to modify the Scheme in order to sell, as well as purchase, bonds (Fisher 
2010).   
Figure 2: Cumulative Gross Issuance of Sterling Bonds by UK PNFCs 
 
 
Source: Fisher 2010  
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Figure 3: Median ‘APF Eligible’ Corporate Bond Spreads(a) 
 
Source: Fisher 2010 
 
Figure 4: Usage of the CPF and the Scheme 
 
Source: Fawley and Neely 2013 
In their comparative study of four quantitative easing programs, Fawley and Neely assert 
that by acting as an MMLR, the Bank “quickly restored market functioning and the price floor 
established by the purchase programs did not bind for long.” While purchases through the 
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CPF peaked quickly, the secondary corporate bond market took longer to recover. Figure 4 
depicts the facility’s continued use through 2012 and its peak in purchases, at £1.6 billion, in 
the second quarter of 2010 (Fawley and Neely 2013). 
It is difficult to isolate the effects of the Corporate Bond Secondary Market Scheme from the 
broader impact of quantitative easing. For example, in the primary market, quantitative 
easing “is estimated to have been a significant factor in lowering gilt yields, and may in turn 
have increased corporate bond issuance” (“Markets and Operations,” 2009). In examining 
the success of the Bank in “invigorating corporate credit markets,” officials also 
acknowledged that private sector purchases, including those through the Corporate Bond 
Secondary Market Scheme, were aided by the larger quantitative easing program, the low 
Bank Rate, and large monetary stimulus within the UK and abroad (Fisher 2010). 
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